Automation and math programming make it possible and, often, desirable to conduct simultaneous, interrelated auctions involving different items, especially in industrial procurement. This talk will describe auctions in which bids may be placed on combinations of items and different ways of structuring them. It will discuss the issues that arise in various different approaches and alternative ways of dealing with these issues. It will then focus on combinatorial industrial procurement auctions and how companies use “business rules” to constrain the auction results. We will then discuss some specific examples of industrial combinatorial procurement auctions.
Michael H. Rothkopf
Michael Rothkopf got a PhD in operations research from MIT and then 24 years of industrial experience (Shell, Xerox, and Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory) before he became a full-time academic at Rutgers in 1988. His first paper on auctions appeared in 1969. He has since written dozens more. He has been studying combinatorial auctions for over a decade and is a consultant to the US Federal Energy Regulatory Commission on electricity auctions. He is past president of INFORMS.