Organiser: Dr Enrico H Gerding
Time: 26/01/2009 13:00-14:00
Most of the existing work on auctions abstracts away from many real-world concerns such as players being risk averse and having limited budgets. In this talk I will present some of the work that I've been doing on analyzing auctions with such realistic concerns. First, I will briefly cover some of these issues, and then I will focus on a particular one. Specifically, I will examine the behavior of bidding agents who not only care about their own profit, but also of the profit obtained by others, so-called spiteful bidders. Thus the agents wish to maximize the weighted difference of their own gain to that of their competitors. By so doing, this work significantly extends the existing state-of-the-art results, mainly by generalizing the results for multi-unit auctions in which multiple items are being sold. Our main result is the derivation of symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibria for the bidding agents in both m-th and (m+1)-th price sealed bid auctions. Subsequently, we use these equilibria to examine the profits of different agents and show that aiming to beat the competition is more effective than pure self interest in a competitive setting. Finally, we examine how the auctioneer's revenue is affected and find that the weight that agents place in minimizing the opponents' profit determines whether the m-th or the (m+1)-th price auction yields a higher revenue.
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